Showing posts with label Chile. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Chile. Show all posts

Thursday, July 27, 2017

27/7/17: Designing a More Equitable System of School Access


In the decades old battle for the future minds, U.S. Republicans and Democrats have been constantly at odds when it comes to how one achieves, simultaneously, higher quality of education and more equitable access to education for those from less well-off families. In the mean time, one country - Chile - has been building up a system of vouchers that, after 36 years worth of experimentations, is delivering on both.

In 2008, Chile introduced a massive reform of its 27-years-old system of education vouchers by passing the Preferential School Subsidy Law (SEP). The system of education funding in Chile is based on universal school voucher payments, but until 2008, the system did not target explicitly those on lower incomes. Then, SEP changed this set up by hiking the value of the voucher by 50 percent for a large category of so-called “Priority students”, a category that primarily covers students “whose family incomes fell within the bottom 40 percent of the national distribution”.

A recent NBER study looked at the results (see full citation and link below).

Specifically, SEP reform stipulated that “to be eligible to accept the higher-valued vouchers from these students, schools were required to waive fees for Priority students and to participate in an accountability system.”

The study used data on math scores attained by “1,631,841 Chilean 4th-grade students who attended one of 8,588 schools during the year 2005 through 2012” and asked the following two questions:

  • “Did student test scores increase and income-based score gaps become smaller during the five years after the passage of SEP?” and
  • “Did SEP contribute to increases in student test scores and, if so, through what mechanisms?”

The study found that:

  1. “On average, student test scores increased markedly and income-based gaps in those scores declined by one-third in the five years after the passage of SEP.” So the effects were in desired direction for all students (improving outcomes) and stronger effect for targeted students (the Priority Students). Better result for all, more equitable result for those in most need.
  2. “The combination of increased support of schools and accountability was the critical mechanism through which the implementation of SEP increased student scores, especially in schools serving high concentrations of low-income students.” So poor performance of less well-off schools improved more than the performance of better-off schools. Again, better result for all, more equitable result for those in most need.
  3. Another important aspect of the study was to identify whether the new vouchers triggered a massive redistribution of better-performing poorer students away from less well-off school. In other words, whether the scheme reform benefited predominantly more those students from the less privileged background who would have gained otherwise. The authors found that “migration of low-income students from public schools to private voucher schools played a small role.”

So you can design a market-based solution for education system funding that does preserve schools choice, enhances educational outcomes for all, and reduces educational inequality.

Full citation: Murnane, Richard J. and Waldman, Marcus and Willett, John B. and Bos, Maria Soledad and Vegas, Emiliana, The Consequences of Educational Voucher Reform in Chile (June 2017). NBER Working Paper No. w23550. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2996306


Thursday, December 12, 2013

12/12/2013: BlackRock Institute Survey: S. America & Asia-Pacific, December 2013


BlackRock Investment Institute released its latest Economic Cycle Survey for EMEA region was covered here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/12/12122013-blackrock-institute-survey.html.

Survey results for North America and Western Europe region were covered here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/12/12122013-blackrock-institute-survey-n.html

Now: Asia-Pacific and Latin America.

"This month’s Asia Pacific Economic Cycle Survey presented a mixed outlook for the region. Out of the 14 countries covered, only India is currently described to be in a recessionary state; however over
the next 2 quarters it is expected to transition to an expansionary phase.

With regards to China, over the next 12 months, a net of 24% of 21 economists expect the economy to
weaken compared to 30% in the October."


Note: The red dot represents Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and the Philippines, where no economists describe the country at hand to be in a recessionary state at present or over the next 6 months.

"This month’s Latin America Economic Cycle Survey presented a mixed outlook for the region.
Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Mexico, Brazil and Chile are described to be in expansionary phases of the cycle and expected to remain so over the next 2 quarters, while Argentina’s growth is expected to deteriorate from expansion to contraction over this horizon."

"Venezuela is described by the consensus to be in a recessionary state, with no improvement to this outlook at the 6 month horizon."


The global growth outlook remains positive from both regions analysts' perspective, though Asia-Pacific analysts are more bullish on global recovery than Latin America's analysts.


Note: these views reflect opinions of survey respondents, not that of the BlackRock Investment Institute. Also note: cover of countries is relatively uneven, with some countries being assessed by a relatively small number of experts.

Sunday, February 3, 2013

3/2/2013: Argentina v Chile: Government & External Balances

In the previous post I looked at the real economy comparatives between Latin America's best-in-class Chile and worst-in-class Argentina.

As promised, now a quick look at the Government and external balances.

If in terms of real economy comparatives, Argentina hardly significantly underperformed Chile since the mid 2000s, in terms of straight down the line General Government Deficits the country is a veritable basket case:

Just as in the case of the real economy, Chile moved dramatically away from Argentina in terms of gross deficits in 1996-2008, outperforming Argentina over that period of time in every year. After 2010, the same picture repeats. On a 5-year average basis, in 1996-2000, average General Deficit in Argentina stood at -3.0%, rising to 6.13% in 2001-2005, declining to -1.74% in 2006-2010 and rising again to -2.83% for 2011-2015 (based on IMF forecasts). Over the same periods of time, Chile recorded average surpluses in every 5 year period: +0.37% in 1996-2000, +0.90% in 2001-2005, +3.03% in 2006-2010 and forecast +0.02% in 2011-2015.

However, much of the headline deficit underperformance by Argentina relates directly to the burden of debt servicing. In this context, Primary Deficits are much more benign to Argentina's case, as illustrated in two charts below:


Again, consider 5-year periods in average annual terms. Due to lack of comprable data for Argentina for 1996-2000, let's omit this subperiod. In 2001-2005, Argentina's primary balance was on average in a surplus of 3.60%, with surplus declining to +2.26% in 2006-2010 and turning a deficit of -0.38% in 2011-2015 forecast period. Meanwhile, Chile enjoyed lower surplus of 1.38% in 2001-2005 epriod, higher surplus of 2.92% in 2006-2010 and a surplus of +0.17% in 2011-2015 period. So while overall Chile did show stronger performance, Argentina's primary deficits were hardly a substantial issue over the period of 2001-present.

Of course, Argentina's debt mountain is legendary... or should it be 'was legendary'?


Argentina's Government Debt/GDP ratio has peaked at 165% in the crisis year of 2002. So much is true. However, overall, the ramp up of debt (dynamics of debt accumulation) and the reduction in debt ratio to economy since the peak have been more than telling. In 1996-2000 Argentina's Government debt/GDP ratio averaged 40.6% - hardly a significant drag on either growth or public finances. In 2001-2005 the same stood at 114.44% of GDP - clearly well in excess of the known bounds for debt sustainability. With debt restructuring and return of economic growth, Argentina's Government debt/GDP ratio fell to 61.99% average for 2006-2010 period and is now on track to hit 43.42% average for 2011-2015. In other words, the country is expected to basically return to pre-crisis levels of Government debt burden by the end of 2015, some 13 years after the crisis.

Over the same period of time, Chile showed exemplary debt performance. Government debt/GDP ratio stood at 13.29% on average during 1996-2000 period, falling to 11.91% in 2001-2005 period and to 5.65% in 2006-2010. Since the devastating earthquake in 2010, debt/GDP ratio notched up to 12.09% for 2011-2015 period.

On external account side, Chile has been a recipient of the strong capital inflows from abroad over recent decades, the position that allowed the country to run significant deficits on trade side. Despite this, overall exports in both countries have been growing roughly-speaking in tandem, with slightly higher volatility for Argentina:


Thus, cumulated current account deficits in the case of Chile run at -104.2% of GDP over 1980-2017 period, against a cumulated deficit of just 24.54% for Argentina. Since 1990 through 2017, Argentina's current account deficits on a cumulated basis will amount to 4.43% of GDP against Chile's 36.62%. And over the period 2000-2017, the IMF is projecting cumulated current account deficit of 9.91% for Chile and a surplus of 20.62% for Argentina.


On the net, excluding fiscal performance and inflation, and keeping in mind that some of the official stats from Argentina are rather dodgy, there is little evidence to suggest that Argentine economy is a 'veritable basket case'. Instead, it is rather an economy struggling with Government debt overhang and fiscal situation whereby benign primary deficits are simply overwhelmed by debt servicing costs. In that sense, Argentina is closer to Italy (correcting for differences in growth rates) than to the 1990s crisis-stricken HIPCs.


Saturday, February 2, 2013

2/2/2013: Argentina v Chile: Real Economy Side


Can't say much, but some debate has rekindled earlier today on twitter about the merits or failures of the Argentine model. In part, this revival of interest stems from the IMF issuing another Executive Board statement on the country (here) basically confirming Argentina's continued failure to implement measures to bring the country back on track with the IMF programme. In part, the said interest has been kept alive by various economics commentators, most notably Paul Krugman (see example here), putting Argentina forward as some sort of a maverick economy with miraculous escape velocity from the clutches of the IMF.

I am of no camp on Argentina. It has made hash of long term macroeconomic management, and had seen virtually no structural change on its erroneous ways of the past. On the other hand, by many macro aggregates, the country is muddling through its perpetual crisis rather well. Yet, some indicators point to very deep problems, namely: inflation, and government spending. It's a mixed bag and I have never advocated its mode of policy choices as a road for anyone to copy.

So with this rather neutral stance, here are some comparatives between Argentina and the strongest economy in the region, Chile (now, Chile is in many ways an example of policy reforms I do like and do put forward occasionally as an example for other countries to pursue).

Let's start from the top: real GDP growth:


All in, based on 5 year averages, Argentina's economy expanded at the average rates of 4.78% in 1991-1995, 2.66% in 1996-2000, 2.35% in 2001-2005, 6.78% in 2006-2010 and expected to grow at 4.47% in 2011-2015 period. At the same time, Chilean economy grew, respectively at 7.88%, 4.21%, 4.4%, 3.86% and 4.91%. Thus, Argentina managed to outperform Chile in growth terms only in one five-year period, namely in 2006-2010 period. How much of this outperformance was due to potentially 'massaged' figures from Argentina on inflation and growth, no one knows.


To make the growth comparatives more clear, let's create two indices, setting GDP at 100 for 1990 and for 2000 for both countries and then computing cumulated path of GDP. It is clear that Chilean economy relative outperformance during the 1990s is the core driver for cumulated differences between the two economies, with that difference becoming virtually zero on aggregate during the 2000-2013 period.

GDP at an aggregate level can present a distorted picture of actual activity, due to a number of demographic factors and price comparatives differentials. Here is what has been happening in the two countries in terms of PPP-adjusted (controlling for price and FX rates differentials) GDP per capita.
Per chart below, the comparatives are sensitive to the specific sub-period:


In absolute terms, per capita income in both countries is tracing relatively similar path, although Chile is running slightly ahead of Argentina since 2012 and this is expected to amplify slightly in 2013-2017. However, the starting point for these comparatives was a significant gap between Chile and Argentina in incomes in the 1980s that became erased by 2000. To see this better, consider the index of GDP epr capital, PPP-adjusted that normalises both countries incomes to 100 in 1980:


Since parity in the 1980 (imposed by assumption here) two countries' incomes closely matched each other until ca 1987. There after, Chile saw dramatic uplift in income per capita, while Argentina experienced relative stagnation until roughly 2001-2002. Since 2002, however, both countries income per capita are growing in relatively parallele fashion, although Chile remains an out-performer compared to Argentina.

Relative differences between the countries in terms of income per capita dynamics are closely matched to difference in savings and investment:

Chile strongly outperformed Argentina in terms of gross national investment in 1991-2005 with average investment rate (by 5 year averages) running at 17.23% in 1991-1995, 19.36% in 1996-2000 and 15.98% in 2001-2005 for Argentina, against 27.46%, 26.84% and 22.33% for Chile. In 2006-2011 this was reversed, with Argentina's gross investment running at 23.56% against 22.19% in Chile. In 2011-2015 it is forecast that Argentina's investment rate will remain at high 24.87% while Chile's investment rate is expected to rise to even more robust 25.53% of GDP.

Identical to investment dynamics are traceable across Gross National Savings:


Thus, there were few notable differences in the savings/investment gap between the two countries, with exception for the period of immediate default in Argentina. Both countries reliance on borrowing and external investment was roughly identical in the period 2006-2010, with weaker reliance in Chile in 1996-2005 and stronger reliance in Chile prior to 1995.


Per unemployment - another variable heavily 'massage-able' by the Governments (and Argentina had quite a share of accusations here):
It is very clear that for Argentina, sky-high rates of unemployment that were present in 1994-2004 period have been declining over time, with 2008-2013 unemployment rates virtually identical for both Chile and Argentina. There is little drama here, as far as we can trust Argentine numbers.

I will focus my attention on comparatives between two countries in terms of fiscal and external balance in the next post, but so far, there is little evidence to suggests hugely dramatic underperformance of Argentine economy in recent years compared to 'best-in-class' case of Chile - a country that as it happens is similar to Argentina in terms of income per capita (which is, of course, a major reason why Argentina should not be compared directly with Brazil).

Stay tuned for more.