Showing posts with label Euro area credit crisis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Euro area credit crisis. Show all posts

Friday, July 12, 2013

12/7/2013: Euromoney Country Risk: Q2 2013 update

Euromoney Country Risk Survey Q2 2013 update is out today, showing continued divergence in risk perceptions about Brics and Europe (rising risks) and North America and Latin America (falling risks):

Largest risk increases are:

One area of interest from my personal perspective: Russia:


"With one or two exceptions, the majority of former Soviet independent states, alongside Russia, have become riskier this year, continuing longer-term trends.

Diminishing economic growth is imparting a negative impact on the region, especially in light of the slowdown in Russia (Russia: Stagnant oil price dampens economic outlook).

However, the risks are also tied to worsening perceptions concerning other indicators, and for a variety of reasons, ranging from Russia’s institutional underpinnings and corruption record, and government stability in Azerbaijan, to currency and information access/transparency concerns in Ukraine and Georgia’s regulatory and policy environment.

The Kyrgyz Republic and Moldova – the latter especially – have seen their political risk profiles downgraded sharply, highlighting the region’s flaws, its failure to capitalize on the eurozone’s worse risk-return opportunities, and why Russia, ranking 62nd globally, is still the only country to score more than 50 out of 100."

I gave a comment on Russian scores changes:

My full view is as follows:

In my view, increased risks associated with the Russian economy relate to the lack of structural drivers for growth, lagging reforms and low returns on reforms already enacted, plus the overall downward revision of the emerging markets and commodities in the environment of highly uncertain and subdued global growth.

Russian Government drive toward modernisation of the economy has dramatically slowed down and is no longer appearing to be a long-term priority for policy development. At the same time, investment in the economy has fallen off the cliff due to a combination of exhaustion of construction investment, Cyprus crisis, continued low FDI and reduced overall economic growth, as well as the perception that tax increases are likely in the near future. Looming ruble devaluation is reducing both FDI and internal investment.

Institutional capital is lagging and remains largely un-effected by reforms rhetoric. If anything, last 24-30 months have seen sustained deterioration in reforms efforts. The comprehensive agenda for modernisation of the economy has been pretty much frozen, if not abandoned.

On the longer-term horizon, emergence of alternative energy supplies and shale gas reserves development worldwide is starting to feed through to the forecasts for future current account and earnings capacity of the Russian economy.

However, there is a negative bias built into markets analysts expectations and assessments of the Russian economy, compared to other BRICS. Brazil and India have largely unsustainable models of longer-term growth driven by internal investment dynamics, instead of institutional capital build up, China is a massive credit bubble ready to blow with current account surpluses acting as the only potential buffer, given already extensive expansion of credit and money supply undertaken, and South Africa is hardly a sustainable, or significant in global terms, economy by any measure. In my opinion, Russia's economic future is highly uncertain. But of all BRICS - Russia has the best potential for stable and sustainable growth based on intrinsic workforce and domestic investment and demand potentials. Whether it will realise these potentials is a different matter.

Sunday, October 28, 2012

28/10/2012: ECB and technocratic decay?


Some interesting comments from BNP on ECB and Mr Draghi's tenure to-date. The note is linked here.  But some quotes are enlightening [comments are my onw]:

"While the ECB justifies the OMT as being to improve the functioning of the monetary system, the fact it has done nothing to help the monetary system in Ireland or Portugal suggests the scheme is about fiscal financing." [I fully agree]

"The balance-sheet implications of buying in the secondary market are the same as if bonds had been bought in the primary market. Mr Draghi’s adherence to the spirit of the Treaty is in question. We support his flexibility, however." [In the short run - yes, Draghi's flexibility is a necessary compromise. Alas, in the long run it is of questionable virtue. Hence, as I remarked ages ago, it's not the measures the ECB unrolls in the crisis that worry me, but the impossibility of unwinding them without wrecking havoc on the economy.]

"...Mr Draghi did [cut rates] in November and December [2011], taking rates back to where they started the year before the two misguided mid-2011 hikes. Mr Draghi cut rates again in July 2012, not only taking the refi rate below the 1% barrier (to 75bp), but also cutting the deposit rate to zero, apparently in an attempt to reinvigorate the interbank market (so far, fruitlessly). Mr Draghi should be praised for cutting rates and for overcoming the 1% barrier, in our view." [I agree.]

"However, he seems to be reluctant to take the deposit rate below zero, which looks timid. Moreover, he has failed to stimulate private credit supply. The LTRO has facilitated the expansion of credit to governments, but to some extent, this has crowded out private-sector credit, where growth is now down 0.8% y/y (-0.4% adjusted for sales and securitisation). The line that this is due to weakness in credit demand is a feeble excuse for the ECB failing to do enough to stimulate supply or to circumvent the lack of credit supply, for example, through credit easing. This has been the major failure of Mr Draghi’s tenure." [I am not so sure on BNP rejecting the idea of weak demand. Most likely, both weak supply and demand are reinforcing each other. More on this once we have our paper on SMEs access to credit published in working paper format, so stay tuned].

And the last blast, the potent one: "If central bankers don’t want politicians to mess with central banking, central bankers would be wise not to mess with politics. Mr Draghi was intimately involved in Italian politics and the demise of former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s tenure in the summer of 2011. More recently, his plans for the OMT were reportedly shared with the German chancellor’s office well in advance. The ECB is a very political animal under Mr Draghi. As the only institution with pan-eurozone power, a prominent role for the ECB in crisis resolution and a strong link to politics
may be unavoidable, and even desirable. But ultimately, such links may return to haunt it." [Yep, I agree. Mr Draghi's competence in office comes with a typical European price tag - get a technocrat and surrender checks and balances. This both signifies to the sickness at the heart of Europe (technocracy displacing democracy) and the inability of the 'patient' to develop institutional path for dealing with this sickness (with EZ potentially/arguably facing either a collapse in the hands of democracy or decay in the hands of technocracy).]

Monday, August 13, 2012

Monday, June 25, 2012

25/6/2012: Thinking outloud: Euro Area Banks Levy

Latest reports suggest the EU leaders are pushing for a 'banking levy' to finance common deposit insurance scheme, a banks resolution fund and joint supervision authority.

It has been my view all along that the former two are required for the financial sector future health and to break the onerous link between the banks and the sovereigns. Alas, I must point out the reality of what such a proposals will mean.

To start with, let's us ask a question: What happens when economy enters a recovery stage from even a cyclical downturn?

Answer: surplus savings built during normal downturn alongside accommodative monetary policies result in an increased supply of capital to finance capex expansion in the private sector. This leads to rising cost of capital on demand side (as demand for capex quickly outstrips supply) and on supply side (as monetary authorities tighten rates into upswing cycle).

But here's a problem, Roger, and it's Europe: suppose the economy is about to take off onto capex growth path:

  • Savings nowhere to be seen as deleveraging of households will be still ongoing
  • Deleveraging of banks, including in anticipation of LTROs expiration means no supply of new credit
  • Policy rates might stay low, but retail rates will remain higher than normal as banks balancesheets remain weak and state or EU-held (via 'resolution' vehicle) equity remains high
  • In the mean time, five years of the crisis have created a massive penned up demand for capital, so market rates will be even higher
  • Equity capital will be scarce, as global recovery will most likely be ongoing, sapping capital into more growth-generative regions, and
  • There's that EU levy as an icing on the cake to add to costs and shrink the margins.
Now, posit the above against the following environment scenario:
  • Households debts are still high, but incomes are now undermined by five years (plus) of a recession and stagnation
  • SMEs and many corproates balancesheets are weak (due to stagnation in exports and internal demand, plus deleveraging costs)
What do you get? Oh, rapid increase in credit costs, leading to more households and business insolvencies. So, go ahead, as Clint The Market would have said, make my day, punk. Raise some more levies...

Thursday, February 2, 2012

2/2/2012: Euro area credit supply remained constrained in Q4 2011


ECB's Bank Lending Survey (BLS) for January 2012 is out, showing dramatic failure of the December 2011 LTRO to kick start supply of credit to the real economy.

According to the BLS, credit standards by euro area banks tightened in the fourth quarter of 2011 on:
  • loans to non-financial corporations (35% of euro area banks report tighter lending to NFCs in net terms, up from 16% in  the preceding quarter),
  • loans to households for house purchase (29% of the euro area banks reporting net tightening of lending to households, up from 18% in the preceding quarter), and 
  • loans for consumer credit (13%, up from 10% in the preceding quarter). 
Looking ahead, euro area banks "expect a further net tightening of credit standards, albeit at a slower pace than in the fourth quarter of 2011" in Q1 2012.  There is no easing of lending conditions on the horizon.

Overall rise in the net tightening  of credit standards was caused by:
  • "the adverse combination of a weakening economic outlook" and 
  • "the euro area sovereign debt crisis, which continued to undermine the banking sector’s financial position",
  • In addition, "increased market scrutiny of bank solvency risks inQ4 2011 is likely to have exacerbated banks’ funding difficulties."
Euro area banks also reported a net decline in the demand for loans to NFCs in Q4 2011, albeit at  a slower pace than in the previous quarter (-5% in net terms, compared with -8% in Q3 2011).

  • Banks indicated a sharp fall in the financing needs of firms for their fixed investment. 
The net demand for loans to households  declined further in Q4 2011, "broadly in line with previous expectations and with actual figures quoted in the previous survey round (-27% in the last quarter of 2011, compared with -24% in Q3 2011 for loans for house purchase, and -16% in the last quarter of 2011, compared with -15% in the third quarter for consumer credit).

For Q1 2012 banks expect a sizeable drop in the net demand for housing loans, while the decline in net demand for consumer credit is expected to remain in the same range.

Despite a massive LTRO in December 2011, "euro area banks reported a slight easing of access to wholesale funding in the last quarter of 2011, compared with replies from the previous survey,
although still a large number of euro area banks  (in net terms) continued to report significant
difficulties. ... Looking ahead, banks across the euro area overall expect some improvement  in access to wholesale market funding in the next quarter, potentially reflecting the anticipated effectiveness of non-standard measures taken by the ECB."

Banks also indicated that "sovereign market tensions led to a substantial deterioration of their funding conditions through balance sheet and liquidity management constraints, as well as through other, more indirect, channels. Banks also reported that vulnerabilities to risks stemming from the sovereign  crisis have significantly contributed to the tightening of credit standards, although some parts of the banking system were in a position to shield their lending policies from the impact of the crisis."

"...On the impact of new regulatory requirements on banks’ lending policies, banks’ replies point
to a further adjustment of risk-weighted assets and capital positions during the second half of 2011, to a larger extent than in the first half of the year and more than envisaged in July 2011. The same
applies for the impact of regulation on the net tightening of credit standards. In the coming months
banks indicate a further intensification of balance sheet adjustments and related constraints on the
bank lending channel."