Showing posts with label credit. Show all posts
Showing posts with label credit. Show all posts

Sunday, September 1, 2019

1/9/19: Priming the Bubble Pump: Extreme Credit Accommodation in the U.S.


Using Chicago Fed National Financial Conditions Credit Subindex (weekly, not seasonally adjusted data), I have plotted credit conditions measurements for expansionary cycles from 1971 through late August 2019. Positive values of the index indicate tightening of credit conditions in the economy, while negative values denote loosening of credit conditions.


Since the start of the 1982 expansionary cycle, every consecutive cycle was associated with sustained, long term loosening of credit conditions, which means the Fed and the regulatory authorities have effectively pumped up credit in the economy during economic expansions - a mark of a pro-cyclical approach to financial policies. This trend became extreme in the last three expansionary cycles, including the current one. In simple terms, credit conditions from the end of the 1990s recession, through today, have been exceptionally accommodating. Not surprisingly, all three expansionary cycles in question have been associated with massive increases in leverage and financialization of the economy, as well as resulting asset bubbles (dot.com bubble in the 1990s, property bubble in the 2000s, and financial assets bubbles in the 2010s).

The current cycle, however, takes this broader trend toward pro-cyclical financial policies to a new level in terms of the duration of accommodation and the fact that it lacks any significant indication of moderation.

Saturday, January 12, 2019

12/1/19: Global Liquidity Conditions


Things are getting ugly in the global liquidity environment.

1) The U.S. Treasuries demand from foreign buyers is drifting down - a trend that has been on-going since mid-2016. As of mid-4Q 2018, the combined foreign institutional holdings of U.S. Treasuries was at its lowest levels since the start of 2015.

2) The U.S. Dollar strength is now at its highest levels since early 2002.


Meanwhile, liquidity is falling:

3) Global liquidity supply is turning down, having trended relatively flat since the start of 2015


This is not a good set of signs, especially as this data is not reflecting, yet, the ECB tightening.

Saturday, September 3, 2016

2/9/16: Does bank competition reduce cost of credit?


In the wake of the Global Financial Crisis, there has been quite a debate about the virtues and the peril of competitive pressures in the banking sector. In a paper, published few years back in the Comparative Economic Studies (Vol. 56, Issue 2, pp. 295-312, 2014 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2329815), myself, Charles Larkin and Brian Lucey have touched upon some of the aspects of this debate.

There are, broadly-speaking two schools of thought on this subject:

  1. The market power hypothesis - implying a negative relationship between bank competition and the cost of credit (as greater competition reduces the market power of banks and induces more competitive pricing of loans). This argument is advanced by those who believe that harmful levels of competition can lead to banks mispricing risk while competing with each other. 
  2. The information hypothesis postulates a positive link between credit cost and competition, as the banks may be facing an incentive to invest in soft information. 


Now, a recent paper from the Bank of Finland, titled “Does bank competition reduce cost of credit? Cross-country evidence from Europe” (authored by Zuzana Fungáčová, Anastasiya Shamshur and Laurent Weill, BOFIT Discussion Papers 6/2016, 30.3.2016) looks at the subject in depth.

Per authors, “despite the extensive debate on the effects of bank competition, only a handful of single-country studies deal with the impact of bank competition on the cost of credit. We contribute to the literature by investigating the impact of bank competition on the cost of credit in a cross-country setting.” The authors take a panel of companies across 20 European countries “covering the period 2001–2011” and study “a broad set of measures of bank competition, including two structural measures (Herfindahl-Hirschman index and CR5), and two non-structural indicators (Lerner index and H-statistic).”


The findings are interesting:

  • “bank competition increases the cost of credit and …the positive influence of bank competition is stronger for smaller companies”
  • These results confirm “the information hypothesis, whereby a lack of competition incentivizes banks to invest in soft information and conversely increased competition raises the cost of credit.” 
  • “The positive impact of bank competition is influenced by two additional characteristics. It is lower during periods of crisis, and the institutional and economic framework influences the relation between competition and the cost of credit.”
  • Overall, however, the “positive impact of bank competition is …influenced by the institutional and economic framework, as well as by the crisis.”


The authors ‘take-away lesson” for policymakers is that “pro-competitive policies in the banking industry can have detrimental effects, … [and] banking competition can have a detrimental influence on financial stability and bank efficiency.”

I disagree. Judging by the above, higher costs of credit overall, and higher costs of credit for smaller firms, may be exactly what is needed to induce greater efficiency and reduce harmful distortions from over-lending. As long as these higher costs reflect actual risk levels.

Friday, September 2, 2016

2/9/16: Interest Rates, Financial Cycles and the Real Economy


Claudio Borio and his team at the Bank for International Settlements have just published another interesting working paper, titled “Monetary policy, the financial cycle and ultra-low interest rates” (BIS Working Papers No 569 by Mikael Juselius, Claudio Borio, Piti Disyatat and Mathias Drehmann Monetary and Economic Department July 2016).


In the paper, the authors ask whether “the prevailing unusually and persistently low real interest rates reflect a decline in the natural rate of interest as commonly thought?”

The authors “argue that this is only part of the story. The critical role of financial factors in influencing medium-term economic fluctuations must also be taken into account.” In other words, the authors attempt to control for purely financial factors driving interest rates first, and then consider predominantly real economic variables-determined rates (natural rates).

You might think that the currently low rates are facilitating the real economy, right? If so, then actual observed (already low) rates today should be coincident with even lower ‘natural’ rates (if real economy drags down the financial economy). Alas, as the authors find: accounting for the different sources of pressure on the interest rates (financial vs natural), in the case of the United States, “yields estimates of the natural rate that are higher and, at least since 2000, decline by less.”

Oops… so persistently low interest rates today are below natural rates and reflect the needs of the financial intermediation sector.


Notice the difference between the observed rates (yellow) and the ‘natural rates’ (red). Or as the lads from BIS put it: “As a result, policy rates have been persistently and systematically below this measure.”

But never mind. With time, things should get rebalanced, as the authors also find that “monetary policy, through the financial cycle, has a long-lasting impact on output and, by implication, on real interest rates. Therefore, a narrative that attributes the decline in real rates primarily to an exogenous fall in the natural rate is incomplete. The influence of monetary and financial factors should not be ignored. Exploiting these results, an illustrative counterfactual experiment suggests that a monetary policy rule that takes financial developments systematically into account during both good and bad times could help dampen the financial cycle, leading to higher output even in the long run.”

Yah, yah… lots of talk. What’s the meaning? Ok, the authors take two drivers of financial sector impact on the real economy: leverage and credit.


Leverage gap is defined as basically a credit to assets ratio for the economy - or how much credit does economy create per each unit of assets. Meanwhile debt service gap is the ratio of debt service payment, or more precisely, “the ratio of interest payments plus amortisations to income”.

To understand the dynamics of the monetary (interest rates) policy impact, the authors do a couple of experiments. The main one is worth discussing. The authors start with a leverage gap of -10%, so there is an excess of assets over credit in the economy and hence there is room to borrow, driving leverage gap up. Note: as the authors point out, the -10% leverage gap assumption is consistent with historical reality: in the late 80s and mid-2000s, “at their trough”, leverage gaps were -11% in 1987 and -20% in 2006 respectively.

So, as I noted above, “a negative leverage gap initially induces a credit boom that then turns into a bust… Initially, the negative leverage gap is followed by rapid credit growth, which in turn feeds into a positive, albeit small, increase in private sector expenditure. But as credit outgrows output, the credit-to-GDP ratio and with it the debt service gap start to rise, putting an increasing drag on output and asset prices. A severe and drawn-out recession follows.”

The dynamics match the Great Recession: “…at the start of 2005, the real-time estimate of the leverage gap was significantly negative while the debt-service gap was positive. Given this starting point, the adjustment dynamics of the system would have predicted much of the subsequent output decline during the Great Recession. This suggests that the recession was not a “black swan” caused by an exogenous shock but, rather, the outcome of the endogenous dynamics of the system – a reflection of the interaction between the financial factors and the
real economy.”

And here is the actual run of annual estimates of the two gaps:


Remember, the cyclicality? Negative leverage gap —> credit boom —> positive leverage gap and positive debt service gap —> bust.

Good thing we are not going to repeat THAT cycle this time around, right?.. Not with all the low interest rates not being lower than ‘natural’ rate… right?



Wednesday, May 4, 2016

3/5/16: Banks Have Way Bigger Problems Than Low Interest Rates


Almost not a day goes by without someone, somewhere in the media whingeing about the huge toll low interest rates take on banks profitability. This is pure red herring put forward by banks' analysts that have an intrinsic interest in sugar-coating the reality of the banking sector failure to adapt to post-GFC environment.

In its international banking sector review for 2015, McKinsey & Company research (see here: http://www.mckinsey.com/industries/financial-services/our-insights/the-fight-for-the-customer-mckinsey-global-banking-annual-review-2015) briefly tackled the pesky issue of banking sector profit margins and their sensitivities to current interest rates environments.

Here’s what McKinsey had to say on interest rates ‘normalisation’ and its impact on banks’ margins:

Source: McKinsey & Co

Do note that 2.3 bps Return on Equity uplift in the case of Eurozone banks is in basis points, on top of 2014 ROE for Eurozone banks of 3.2%. Which would push ROE to 5.5% range.

Here are the conclusions: “In our analysis, however, even if rates rise broadly – a big if – banks will not do as well as many expect; margins will not jump back to previous levels. Much of the benefit will get competed away, and risk costs will likely increase, especially in economies where the recovery is still fragile. …On average, banks in the Eurozone and the U.S. would see jumps in ROE of about 2 percentage points, but these gains would still not lift returns above COE (Cost of Equity). And as the “taper tantrum” of 2013 showed, the reaction of markets to a change in central bank policy is far from clear; unforeseen problems could easily overshadow any gains from a rate rise.”

So to sum this up:

1) Let’s stop whingeing about poor banks squeezed by low interest rates: these banks face zero or even negative cost of funding which subsidies their unsustainable business model; the same banks are also benefiting from a massive monetary subsidy (low interest rates reduce loans defaults and prolong cash extraction period for the banks prior to loan default materialisation);
2) Even if interest rates are ‘normalised’, the banks won’t be able to cover the cost of equity through their normal operations; and
3) The real reason banks are bleeding profits is because they are incapable of reforming their business models and product offers and are, as the result, suffering from challengers taking chunks out of traditional banks’ most profitable business strategies.

But, more on this in my forthcoming article for the International Banker.



Monday, March 23, 2015

23/3/15: Credit, Domestic Demand and Investment: Euro Area in Three Charts


Three interesting charts outlining the big themes in Euro area economy:

First the 'limping leg' of the euro recovery: credit. Chart below shows decomposition and dynamics in corporate credit, with Q1 2015 reading so far pointing to a very robust demand for credit, and (even more importantly) credit driven by fixed investment. This should provide some support for Domestic Demand, albeit at the expense of re-leveraging the economy via bank channel (as opposed to leverage-neutral equity or non-bank credit, such as direct debt issuance):

Source: @FGoria

The importance of investment uplift is hard to underestimate in the case of the euro area, as the next chart clearly illustrates:

 Source: @FGoria

And this translates into depressed Domestic Demand (C+G+I bit of the national accounts):

Source: @FGoria

The gap between U.S. and the euro area is understandable. But the gap between Japan and the euro area is truly shocking, once one considers the state of the Japanese economy and the sheer magnitude of monetary stimulus that Japan had to deploy to push its Domestic Demand up from 2011.

In simple terms, the above charts show some revival in the euro area fortunes. In more complex terms, one has to wonder what this revival hinges on. In my opinion, we are seeing a bounce in credit creation that is not sustainable given the state of the global economy (with global trade flows remaining weak) and the conditions of households across the euro area (with domestic consumption and household investment still weak). 

Monday, January 12, 2015

12/1/2015: Euro Area vs US Banks and Monetary Policy: The Weakest Link


Cukierman, Alex, "Euro-Area and US Banks Behavior, and ECB-Fed Monetary Policies During the Global Financial Crisis: A Comparison" (December 2014, CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10289: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2535426) compared "…the behavior of Euro-Area (EA) banks' credit and reserves with those of US banks following respective major crisis triggers (Lehman's collapse in the US and the 2009 [Greek crisis])".

The paper shows that, "although the behavior of banks' credit following those widely observed crisis triggers is similar in the EA and in the US, the behavior of their reserves is quite different":

  • "US banks' reserves have been on an uninterrupted upward trend since Lehman's collapse"
  • EA banks reserves "fluctuated markedly in both directions". 


Per authors, "the source, this is due to differences in the liquidity injections procedures between the Eurosystem and the Fed. Those different procedures are traced, in turn, to differences in the relative importance of banking credit within the total amount of credit intermediated through banks and bond issues in the EA and the US as well as to the higher institutional aversion of the ECB to inflation relatively to that of the Fed."

Couple of charts to illustrate.


As the charts above illustrate, US banking system much more robustly links deposits and credit issuance than the European system. In plain terms, traditional banking (despite all the securitisation innovations of the past) is much better represented in the US than in Europe.

So much for the European meme of the century:

  1. The EA banking system was not a victim of the US-induced crisis, but rather an over-leveraged, less deposits-focused banking structure that operates in the economies much more reliant on bank debt than on other forms of corporate funding; and
  2. The solution to the European growth problem is not to channel more debt into the corporate sector, thus only depressing further the reserves to credit ratio line (red line) in the second chart above, but to assist deleveraging of the intermediated debt pile in the short run, increasing bank system reserves to credit ratio in the medium term (by increasing households' capacity to fund deposits) and decreasing overall share of intermediated (banks-issued) debt in the system of corporate funding in the long run.


Friday, January 2, 2015

2/1/2015: Monetary Policy and Property Bubbles


Returning again to the issue of lender/funder liability in triggering asset price bubbles (see more on this here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/01/112015-share-liability-debtor-and-lender.html), CEPR Discussion Paper "Betting the House" (see
http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=10305) by Òscar Jordà, Moritz Schularick, Alan M. Taylor asks a question if there is "a link between loose monetary conditions, credit growth, house price booms, and financial instability?"

The authors look into "the role of interest rates and credit in driving house price booms and busts with data spanning 140 years of modern economic history in the advanced economies. We exploit the implications of the macroeconomic policy trilemma to identify exogenous variation in monetary conditions: countries with fixed exchange regimes often see fluctuations in short-term interest rates unrelated to home economic conditions."

Do note: Ireland and the rest of euro periphery are the prime examples of this specific case.

The authors find that "…loose monetary conditions lead to booms in real estate lending and house prices bubbles; these, in turn, materially heighten the risk of financial crises. Both effects have become stronger in the postwar era."

So let's give the ECB a call… 

Monday, November 5, 2012

5/11/2012: Bank credit to SMEs - demand side


My paper with Javier Sánchez Vidal, Ciaran Mac an Bhaird and Brian M. Lucey "What Determines the Decision to Apply for Credit? Evidence for Eurozone SMEs" is available here.